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ABSTRACT 
We are able to participate in countless different sorts of social practice. This indefinite set 
of capacities must be explainable in terms of a finite stock of capacities. This paper 
compares and contrasts two different explanations. A standard decomposition of the 
capacity to participate in social practices goes something like this: the interpreter arrives 
on the scene with a stock of generic practice-types. He looks at the current scene to fill-in 
the current tokens of these types. He looks at the current state of these practice tokens to 
see what actions are available to him. He uses his current desires to choose between these 
various possible actions. I argue that this standard explanation is defective, drawing on 
arguments by Searle and Wittgenstein and Garfinkel. I propose an alternative 
explanation, in which the participants must continually show each other the state of the 
scene in order to maintain the scene’s intelligibility. I provide a simple formal language in 
which to describe this alternative approach, in which we can state quite precisely what 
someone is (and should be) doing when they participate in a practice. This language is 
related to both deontic and epistemic logics, but it is much simpler – it does not include 
the classic propositional connectives, and it is driven by a very different set of 
assumptions. The inspirations for this formal language are Searle’s analysis of directions of 
fit, Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following and Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology. 
 
 
1. Decomposing the Capacity to Participate in Practices 
 
As social creatures, we are capable of participating in an indefinite variety of 
social practices. As Wittgenstein reminds us: “But how many kinds of 
sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and command? – There are 
countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call ‘symbols’, 
‘words’, ‘sentences’. And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once 
for all; but new types of language, new language- games, as we may say, 
come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten.” 
[Philosophical Investigations §23] 
How do we manage to participate in so many different kinds of social 
practice? We cannot have a countless number of primitive capacities. There 
                                                 
* I am very grateful to John Searle, Asa Andersen, Maya Kronfeld, and Raffaela Giovagnoli 
for feedback on a previous draft. 
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must be a small finite stock of capacities which can be recursively combined 
to produce our ability to understand and participate in an indefinite number 
of different types of practice. 
Consider, for example, a mechanical piano, which can play any number of 
tunes. These different capacities – the capacity to play Humpty Dumpty, the 
capacity to play Yankee Doodle, etc – cannot be separate primitive 
capacities. There are just too many of them. There must be a general 
explanation which can say how these infinitely many capacities can come 
from a small finite collection of general capacities. In this case, the 
explanation is based on the mechanical piano’s ability to read any piano roll 
(a roll of paper with perforations representing notes). Each tune can be 
represented by a particular piano roll, so the capacity to play an indefinite 
number of tunes can be explained in terms of one general capacity (to play 
any piano roll) plus a mapping from each of the different tunes to its 
representation on a piano roll. 
This sort of example suggests one obvious way to break-down the 
capacity to participate into a small set of finite components: invoking a 
distinction between practice-types and tokens. 
 
 
2. The Type/Token Approach 
 
There is one seemingly natural way to explain or decompose the ability to 
participate in practices. This is what I will call the Type/Token approach. 
It goes like this: our training and history has given us a library of practice-
types which we understand. In any particular situation, we apply these types 
to the current situation, instantiating particular tokens of those types.  
Now we can be in many different practices simultaneously. (Think of a 
mother who is standing in line while trying to restrain her infant). So the 
current social scene is the union of the practice tokens we are currently in. 
Each practice token issues us with new options, actions we are capable of 
doing: new capacities. We use our desire to weigh these various actions, to 
decide what to do. 
In this picture, participating in a practice requires two primitive mental 
capacities: Scorekeeping and Revelation. Scorekeeping is the ability to use 
facts about the current situation to turn practice-types into practice-tokens: 
particular instances of practices, instantiated with particular individual 
agents and objects (for example, this particular chess game between Jack and 
Jill). Revelation is the ability to understand, based on past history, a new 
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practice-type. (This might be, for instance, by using Bayesian statistical 
learning from past examples). 
In this picture, we see the particular practice instances of the current 
social scene through the lens of the practice-types.  
It is helpful to focus on a concrete case. Throughout this paper, I shall use 
the example of a queue: people standing in line, waiting to get on the bus. 
According to the Type/Token approach, someone who is participating in the 
bus queue is doing so because he has an understanding of a practice-type – 
queuing – and he has used information about the particular scene around him 
to instantiate a particular practice-token – queuing for this particular bus 
with these particular people on this particular day in February. A 
scorekeeper participating in this queue-instance sees that the queue makes a 
new action available to him: he is able to queue up. He evaluates this new 
action by assigning it a score, based on his desires, and compares it with what 
he is currently doing. How did he come to an understanding of the general 
practice-type of queuing? According to the Type/Token approach being 
considered here, his capacity for Revelation made the practice-type available 
to him, perhaps as a Bayesian statistical generalization from observing 
various examples of queuing behavior in the past.  
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Current Facts
Revelation
Practice Types
Scorekeeping
Practice Tokens
Action Extraction
Choices
History
Desires
Humean decision making
Chosen action  
 
 
Here, processes are represented by curved boxes, data by rectangles, and 
information flow by arrows. According to the Type/Token approach, we 
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construct practice-types from past data using a faculty called Revelation. We 
use Scorekeeping to instantiate practice-types into practice-tokens, using 
facts about the current situation. We extract from the practice-tokens the 
actions that are currently available to us. We weigh up the various choices 
using our desires to choose the action which best satisfies our desires.  
I used to subscribe to the Type/Token approach – I didn’t really 
understand there was an alternative. I used to think this is what 
Wittgenstein thought, too. I gave a talk, entitled “Implementing 
Wittgenstein”, about this. I now think a better name for the talk would be 
“Completely Failing to Implement Wittgenstein”.  
I now think the Type/Token approach is wrong. The rest of this paper will 
show why it is wrong, and describe an alternative approach. 
 
3. Problems with the Type/Token Approach 
 
There are three main problems with the Type/Token approach to 
decomposing the capacity to participate in practices: 
Firstly, the Type/Token approach assumes a fundamental mental 
capacity – scorekeeping – which is outside the practices which it seeks to 
understand: scorekeeping is just something our minds do in private. But 
scorekeeping isn’t a private mental capacity. Keeping score on a practice, 
knowing what state it is in, is a public action. Others can see that we are 
doing it, and we are accountable for how we do it. Scorekeeping is part of the 
very practice which it seeks to understand. 
Secondly, and even more fundamentally, it misrepresents the distinction 
between the interpreter, a newcomer who has to understand the practice, and 
the expert participants, who are at home in the practice, who are effortlessly 
participating. According to the Type/Token approach, the newcomer has to 
do the work of seeing the state of the practice just from watching the actions 
of the expert participants. This picture assumes a fundamental asymmetry of 
responsibility: the interpreter is responsible for scorekeeping, but accords no 
responsibility to the participants who are already involved. The truth is 
rather that all participants are continually responsible for showing or 
manifesting the state of the practice to each other. Showing the state of the 
practice is a public witnessable act, just like seeing the state of the practice, 
and is equally accountable - failures to show may be censored. Showing the 
state of the practice is part of the practice which it seeks to describe. 
Thirdly, it assumes a Humean understanding of decision-making as a non-
rational weighing of desires. But this irrational weighing puts a depressing 
Richard Evans 
 208
limit on our capacity for rational self-realization, and renders us merely 
beasts who calculate. Deciding what to do is itself a public, seeable act, 
subject to normative assessment. Deciding what to do in a situation is part of 
the very situation it seeks to evaluate.  
I shall elaborate on each of these. 
 
4 Scorekeeping is part of the very practice which it seeks to understand 
 
Scorekeeping is not a hidden private mental act, but a public act: others can 
see that we are doing it.  
Consider the people queuing for the bus. A newcomer arrives, and looks 
for the end of the line. His looking-for-the-end-of-the-line is itself something 
that others can see him doing. As Garfinkel remarks, “the end of the line is 
watchably searched-for”. Garfinkel is here stressing that the seeing which the 
newcomers should do is a public seeing which can itself be seen by others. His 
scorekeeping is directly visible to the others. If he fails to do it correctly, if he 
fails to see the back of the queue correctly, he is culpable and will be 
corrected by the others. When people join queues they are expected to 
position themselves correctly. But it is not just his placement which is 
subject to normative assessment - his scorekeeping of other people’s 
placement is equally susceptible. 
Wittgenstein writes: “Try not to think of understanding as a ‘mental 
process’ at all. – For that is the expression which confuses you… In the sense 
in which there are processes (including mental processes) which are 
characteristic of understanding, under standing is not a mental process.” 
[Philosophical Investigations §154] 
Scorekeeping isn’t something we do secretly in our private mental 
kingdom. Scorekeeping is a public action. Because it is public, scorekeeping is 
itself subject to normative assessment and evaluation: others can see that we 
are doing it, and can see when we are doing it wrong. Participants are 
expected to see that the practice is in a certain state. Others will notice if a 
participant has failed to see something that he should see, and may rebuke 
him because of his failure to see. 
 
5. Showing the state of the practice is part of the practice which it seeks to describe 
 
The Type/Token approach is often motivated by seeing the situation through 
the eyes of the newcomer, or outsider, who has to understand what the 
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participants are doing. We are immediately led to see the problem as the 
newcomer’s problem: he alone has to figure out what is going on. 
But it is not just the responsibility of the interpreter to see the state of the 
practice – it is equally the responsibility of the participants to continually 
manifest or show the state of the practice. In the Type/Token picture, we 
imagine the people who are at home in the practice participating effortlessly, 
and we imagine a newcomer, who wants to understand and join in. We ask – 
what does the newcomer have to do to understand and join in? But this 
question presupposes an asymmetry of responsibility between the newcomer 
and the regulars. In the alternative ethnomethodological perspective, the 
responsibility of creating intelligibility is shared equally amongst the 
participants. What it is to be a participant is for it to be the case that you 
should show the state of the practice. 
The scene needs to be continually reinforced through our continually 
manifesting its state to each other, and this manifestation is our continual 
responsibility as participants. 
Laurie Andersen, a performance artist, uses the following words in one of 
her pieces: “You’re walking. And you don’t always realize it, but you’re 
always falling. With each step you fall forward slightly. And then catch 
yourself from falling. Over and over, you’re falling. And then catching 
yourself from falling. And this is how you can be walking and falling at the 
same time. [Walking & Falling]” 
Similarly, when we are in practices, intelligibility is continually being lost 
and found, and lost again and found again. Showing each other the state of 
the practice is what we do to pick ourselves up when we fall.  
We are always continually showing each other the state of the situation 
we are in. This is not something we do just with children, or out of politeness 
– we have to continually show in order to be in the situation at all. 
John Searle is well aware of this. In Social Ontology: Some Basic 
Principles, he uses status-function declarations as the explanatorily-
fundamental action out of which social practices are constructed. These 
status-function declarations are precisely a way of showing the state of the 
situation. (Although, perhaps, from the ethnomethodological perspective 
being proposed here, Searle does not go quite far enough. He sometimes gives 
the impression that these showings are things you do once, at the beginning 
of the practice, to set up the roles - whereas the ethnomethodologist sees the 
showings as things which have to be continually reinforced. The creation of 
social intelligibility is an ongoing achievement which is in continual danger of 
falling apart, and needs to be supported with showings at every stage).  
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Queues are an excellent example of this. The participants are preoccupied 
with place-work: showing the state of the practice by their orientation and 
position. As Garfinkel says: “Persons are positioned and oriented to make a 
great positioning to-do about places in line.” 
They produce the intelligibility of the local queue by showing their place in 
line. In Autochthonous Properties of Formatted Queues, Garfinkel describes the 
work of the participants that is performed in order to achieve the coherence 
of the queue: 
• Each person is showing he is behind the one in front. 
• When something goes wrong, when a newcomer attempts to join 
the queue in the middle, perhaps because he hasn’t noticed the 
people behind, the participants will show him that and how he 
has gone wrong. This showing is not just grumpiness or irritation 
on their part. This showing is part of the work of producing the 
intelligibility of the scene. 
• “Consider how frequently mothers restrain their children” in 
queues – they are not doing this just out of politeness or some 
old-fashioned sense of social propriety – it is part of the work of 
being in the queue that they show their position: they are 
responsible for their children, who are also in the queue, so they 
also have to keep their position for them.  
• Showing the state of the practice is the continual duty of the 
participants, without which the practice would cease to be. This 
work of showing what should be done is continual, relied upon, 
but unnoticed. 
If this work of showing were to cease, the practice would cease to be. This 
fundamental ethnomethodological point is obscured by the philosopher’s 
favorite example of a social practice – a board-game. In a board-game like 
chess, the board and the pieces themselves do the work of showing the state 
of the practice1. In this respect, philosopher’s favorite example of a practice is 
seriously misleading: this case is an example of the mechanization of practice, 
                                                 
1 Well, almost – there are a couple of aspects of the state of the scene which are not explicit in 
the board position: whose move it is, and how many times the same move sequence has been 
repeate 
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where the work of manifesting has been handed down from the participants 
to the objects2.  
The Type/Token approach assumes we see the local practice token 
through the lens of the practice-type. It assumes a sharp dichotomy between 
routine Scorekeeping and inspired Revelation. But this dichotomy is false to 
the facts. 
Consider, for example, variations on the typical queue. Consider the scene 
that has sprung up around the coffee machine in the office: people have 
arrived to get coffee in a specific order; they themselves know the order they 
arrived in, but the local area around the coffee machine is cramped and not 
conducive to the formation of an actual line, so the participants are unable to 
show their position in line by their placement and orientation. This is what 
Garfinkel calls a “local interactional crush”. Some aspects of the queue have 
been preserved, but others have been lost. Or consider a variant queue in 
which, instead of each participant standing behind the person in front of him, 
he has a laser pointer, and he points the laser’s light at the person in front of 
him. Is this a queue? The Type/Token approach would either have to have a 
massively general version of a queue, or it would have to allow different sorts 
of queue types. And how does someone learn a new queue type? This is why I 
named the faculty “Revelation” - to underline its mysteriousness. 
Wittgenstein was well aware of this: “We can easily imagine people 
amusing themselves in a field by playing with a ball so as to start various 
existing games, but playing many without finishing them and in between 
throwing the ball aimlessly into the air, chasing one another with the ball 
and bombarding one another for a joke and so on. And now someone says: 
The whole time they are playing a ball game and following definite rules at 
every throw. [Philosophical Investigations, §83] 
Here he attacks the root idea that we see the local scene through the lens 
of a given set of practice-types. 
The ethnomethodological/Wittgenstinian alternative has a different 
understanding of how we understand new situations. Not only are seeing and 
showing public accountable acts, but showing what others should see is also 
part of the practice. Training (showing others what they should see) is also part 
of the practice which it seeks to teach others how to participate in. Because the 
newcomer is shown how to see, he has a way into the practice which does not 
                                                 
2 This is why Garfinkel urges us to consider cases of double-blind chess – cases where both 
players are blind-folded, and have to speak their moves to each other. Now that we no longer 
have the pieces to show us the state of the situation, the work needed to show the state of the 
scene comes immediately to the foreground. 
Richard Evans 
 212
involve revelation of a new practice-type. If he did, and if Bayesian learning 
or something similar is needed to learn a practice type, people would never be 
able to participate in new practices unless they had seen several prior 
examples. But the reality is that people just immediately understand. What 
actually happens is not that he performs induction over past behaviors to 
generate a new type, but that he is trained how to see this particular scene. 
He understands the local scene immediately, by letting others show him how 
to see. In this alternative picture, practice-types are generalizations which are 
made subsequent to understanding the local scene we are in, not concepts 
which we need prior to understanding the local scene. In this alternative 
picture, generalizations are models of the practice3 which lose information. 
The showings and seeings themselves are lost when we generalize from the 
token to the type. In the alternative ethnomethodological picture, the 
pattern is new in every moment, and there is no sharp distinction between 
scorekeeping and revelation.  
 
6. The Humean understanding of Decision-Making is flawed 
 
We have looked at two fundamental problems with the Type/Token 
approach. The third problem is that it gives an inadequate conception of an 
agent’s decision-making.  
In some sense, participation in practices expands our possibilities and 
allows us to do things we couldn’t do otherwise. This constitutive nature of 
practices can be understood in two ways: 
• Participating in the practice gives us new (non-deontic) capacities 
• Participating in the practice gives us new norms to follow 
Let us consider a concrete example. Because I am playing chess, and 
because the current position is such, I am able to castle on the king’s side. I 
wouldn’t be able to castle on the king’s side if I wasn’t playing chess. Now is 
this expansion of my agency to be understood as a new capacity (like being 
able to fly), or should it be understood as a new norm (which can be followed 
or not followed). When deciding whether to castle, do I need to use desires to 
weigh up the relative benefits of castling and not-castling, or alternatively do 
I use reason to resolve the various conflicting norms? 
                                                 
3 For this reason, ethnomethodologists typically use the word “scene” to represent the local 
norms making up the current moment, rather than the word “practice” which admits of a 
type/token distinction. 
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The type-token approach sees practices as expanding our agency by 
giving us new (non-deontic) capacities. In this approach, we need our 
decision-making (based on desires) to resolve between various competing 
capacities. According to this view, whenever a practice contains a 
constitutive rule which enables a new type of action (e.g. the practice of 
playing chess allowing us to perform a castling operation), if we are to 
perform this new action, we must have a desire which motivates us to 
perform it. This view is recognizably Humean.  
An alternative approach is to see the practice as giving us norms – things 
we should do. In this case, we need our reason to resolve between various 
conflicting norms (just as it also resolves between conflicting factual claims). 
In this alternative view, norms explain desires. This view is recognizably 
Kantian.  
 
 Hume Kant 
What practices 
give us 
Capacities Norms 
How we resolve 
different 
requests 
By weighing our 
desires  
By resolving the 
incompatibility between 
norms  
 
The problem with the Humean picture, of practices giving us the capacity 
to perform new actions which we use our desires to adjudicate between, is 
that it pushes the question back only one step further, and leaves 
unanswered the obvious next question – how do we decide which desires to 
adopt? The Humean gives no answer to this – we weigh the various actions 
according to the various desires, but the desires are simply given. In this 
picture, reasoning about what I should do is very different from reasoning 
about what is the case – reasoning about action involves weighing the 
strengths of various considerations, rather than resolving incompatible 
claims. The Humean has this depressing view of people as merely beasts who 
calculate. The alternative is that practices yield norms, and norms are 
evaluated according to the same canons of rationality that are used to 
evaluate declarative claims: we look at the reasons for the conflicting claims. 
This alternative is rationalist in that there is no aspect of decision-making 
which is incapable of being brought under the scrutiny of rationality.  
Note that the three criticisms of the Type/Token approach have all had 
the same form: the Type/Token approach assumes that in order to 
participate in a practice, there is a capacity (scorekeeping, manifesting the 
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state of the practice, decision-making via the weighing of desires) which is 
outside the practice. In each case, the proposed ethnomethodological 
alternative is to move the capacity inside the practice so that it is public, 
witnessable and itself susceptible to normative evaluation.  
The Type/Token approach is more than just the claim that it is possible to 
divide practices into types and tokens. It is uncontroversial that we discern 
certain practice-types in our culture. What is controversial and unsatisfying 
about the Type/Token approach is not the distinction itself, but how the 
distinction is used. At the heart of Type/Token approach is the idea that we 
understand the particular practice tokens through a prior understanding of 
the practice-types. It is this claim which the ethnomethodological alternative 
denies. 
This diagram summarizes the alternative ethnomethodological approach I 
am recommending: 
 
Participating in the Local Scene
Seeing Showing
What is the Case
What Should be the Case
Seeing the current state of 
the local situation
Seeing what should be the 
case in the local situation. 
This includes decision-
making as a special case.
Showing others what is 
happening in the local 
situation (teaching)
Showing others what should 
be the case (training)
Generalization
Practice Types
 
 
Here, scorekeeping (seeing) and manifesting the state of the scene 
(showing) are activities which are themselves part of that very scene. 
Understanding the local scene involves seeing both what is the case, and 
what should be the case. In this picture, practice-types are objects which we 
construct subsequent to understanding the local scene, by a process of 
generalization. In this picture, generalization is a process of dropping 
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information from the local scene. When generalizing, we must be very careful 
not to lose sight of the very seeings and showings which made the local scene 
intelligible in the first place.  
 
 
7. Recap 
 
I have been criticizing the Type/Token approach, and in doing so, proposing 
an alternative.  
 
 Type/Token Alternative 
(Wittgenstein / 
Ethnomethodology) 
Scorekeeping 
(Seeing) 
Scorekeeping is a private 
mental capacity. 
Scorekeeping is a public 
act which is part of the 
very practice which it 
seeks to understand, 
itself subject to 
normative assessment. 
Revelation Revelation is the ability 
to divine new practice-
types. It is a private 
mental capacity which is 
sharply distinct from 
scorekeeping. 
Instead of two very 
different types of 
capacity, there is only 
one capacity: the ability 
to see the local norms in 
the local situation.  
Manifesting the state of 
the practice 
(Showing) 
Showing is a separate 
optional action done by 
teachers to novices. 
Showing is a public act 
which is continually 
expected of all 
participants, which is 
itself subject to 
normative assessment. 
Decision-making The practice gives us the 
capacity to perform new 
actions. We evaluate 
these actions according to 
our desires, by weighing 
them. 
The practice gives us 
norms. We resolve 
incompatible norms in 
the same sort of way in 
which we resolve 
incompatible 
declarative sentences. 
Priority of practice We understand the We generalize to the 
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types to tokens practice-token we are 
currently in because we 
understand the practice-
type. 
practice-type because 
we understand the 
practice-token we are 
in. In the act of 
generalization, much of 
the detail of the work 
needed to manifest the 
local situation is lost. 
The local situation The local situation is just 
the union of the practice 
tokens we are currently 
in. 
The local situation is a 
collection of local 
norms. 
 
These criticisms of the Type/Token approach have been based on an 
alternative proposal: the intelligibility of the local practice is an ongoing 
achievement, requiring constant work from the participants. This work is the 
manifestation of the state of the scene. It is not just the interpreter (or 
newcomer) who must see the state of the situation, but all participants must 
continually see and show the state of the scene. Their continual seeing and 
showing is “keeping it real”, in a very real sense. 
In case you were worrying that this is all getting a little too 
ethnomethodological, I am about to reformulate this alternative approach in 
a formal language.  
 
 
8. Can the Alternative Wittgenstinian/Ethnomethodological Approach Be 
Formalized? 
 
We can participate in an indefinite variety of practices. This infinite array of 
capacities needs to be decomposed into a finite set of capacities. I have been 
looking at the traditional decomposition, the Type/Token approach, and 
have been criticizing it on ethnomethodological and Wittgenstinian grounds. 
But can the ethnomethodological alternative be used as a decompositional 
account of the capacity to participate in practices? Are the insights of 
Ethnomethodology merely negative, merely showing what is wrong with the 
Type/Token approach, or do they point the way to an alternative 
decomposition of the ability to participate in practices? Is the 
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Wittgenstinian/ethnomethodological position merely destructive4, or can it 
be used constructively? 
Can we combine the ethnomethodological insights of 
Garfinkel/Wittgenstein with the desire for a formal decomposition? 
Searle comes close to combining the ethnomethodological position with a 
desire for a formal decomposition. He subscribes to at least two of the central 
claims of the ethnomethodological alternative to the Type/Token approach: 
 
• Showing the state of the practice is itself part of the practice. His 
own formulation of this is in terms of status function 
declarations 
• Understanding a practice requires understanding the deontic 
norms which flow from it. It is insufficient to see the practice as 
yielding non-deontic capacities. To understand it, we must 
understand it as yielding norms.  
 
But Searle combines these insights with the desire to decompose the 
capacity to participate in practices into its constituent parts: “If there is one 
thing we know from the cultural anthropology of the past century, it is that 
there is an enormous variety of different modes of social existence. The 
assumption I will be making, and will try to justify, is that even though there 
is an enormous variety, the principles that underlie the constitution of social 
reality are rather few in number.” [Social Ontology: Some Basic Principles, p. 
6] And again: “[Our investigation] has begun to show that the enormous 
complexity of the body of institutional reality has a rather simple skeletal 
structure. [Social Construction of Reality, p.112] 
With the exception of Searle, ethnomethodology and formal 
decomposition have not, to my knowledge, been conjoined. It may be a 
matter of mere historical accident, but the people who advocated the 
ethnomethodological approach were uninterested or worse, deeply skeptical, 
of the formal decompositional approach.  
We have been focusing on two pairs of alternatives. So there are four 
possibilities: 
 
                                                 
4 Wittgenstein didn’t seem to think that this sort of decomposition was worthwhile. (Or, 
perhaps, he just didn’t think that such a decomposition was part of philosophy. Perhaps his 
point was merely demarcational). 
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I am sympathetic to both the ethnomethodologists and the formalists, 
and – at the risk of irritating both sides – I hope to combine them. 
 
 
9. Defining a Formal Language for Describing Situations 
 
We are looking at ethnomethodological theories in which seeing the state of 
the situation and showing others the state of the situation are core parts of 
the very practices which they seek to describe. But unlike the authors who 
inspired this perspective, who are uninterested in (or skeptical of) the need to 
re-express this position formally, we want a formal language in which this 
capacity can be broken down into its constituent parts. We want a formal 
language of practice, as opposed to a language of thought.  
I will now give a simple language in which this capacity is decomposed. 
The guiding intuition behind L is to give equal status to two pairs of 
complementary concepts: See/Show and Normative/Descriptive. 
 
 Normative Descriptive 
See Seeing what should be 
the case 
Seeing what is the case 
Show Showing what should 
be the case 
Showing what is the 
case 
 
Seeing is here being used to denote a pre-linguistic form of awareness, not 
necessarily related to vision. Seeing is the sort of awareness that a dog has 
when he sees that there is a squirrel in the tree. This pre-linguistic form of 
Seeing is to be contrasted with fine-grained intensional states like belief. 
Scorekeeping is one particular form of Seeing — scorekeeping just is seeing 
the state of the local scene.  
Showing is here being used to denote a pre-linguistic form of 
communication. This pre-linguistic form of Showing is to be contrasted with 
intensional speech acts like saying. 
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Given that seeing and showing are core parts of the practice, and that we 
are interested in cases where seeing and showing are themselves subject to 
normative assessment (cases where someone should see or should show), the 
first place to look would be some sort of combination of deontic and epistemic 
logic.  
But such a combination would presuppose logical connectives. If it 
presupposed complex logical language, it would not be a foundational 
language. Furthermore, standard deontic logic is unsatisfactory in many 
ways as a formal language for modeling norms: it inherits all the problems 
from propositional logic to do with material implication being a weak and 
distorted interpretation of implication, and it introduces problems of its own. 
It means that, for example O(p ∨ ~p) has to be intelligible.  
The language to be presented here, by contrast, is pre-logical: it does not 
include disjunction or negation or existential quantification. We cannot even 
express O(p ∨ q) in this language. It is intended to be the simplest possible 
language in which to describe norms of seeing and showing. 
I wanted the language to be simple, and I wanted a simple name to call it. 
So I decided to call it L.  
 
10. The Syntax of L 
 
L is defined according to the rules: 
 
States S ::= F | F(x1, …, xn)  
Terms T ::= S | S.T | S:T 
Expressions E ::= T | See(x, J) | Show(x, y, J) 
Deontic Formulae D ::= ↑E | ↓E 
Conjunctions C ::= D | D ∧ C 
Judgments J ::= C | C → C 
 
Here 
• F is a function term, and x1, …, xn are terms referring to 
individual objects.  
• S.T and S:T are ways of specifying sub-states of S, so we can 
build trees of expressions. In S.T, T is the unique child of S, in 
S:T, we are saying that T is one of the children of S, but there 
may be many others.  
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• ↑E says that E should be the case. ↓E says that E actually is 
the case.  
• See is the term in L for scorekeeping the state of the practice. 
See(x, J) means that agent x sees that J. J itself may be either 
normative (↑) or descriptive (↓). 
• Show is the term in L for manifesting the state of the practice. 
Show(x, y, J) means that agent x shows agent y that J. 
Again, J itself may be either normative or descriptive. 
 
The richness of L derives from the recursive clauses for Terms, 
Expressions, Conjunctions and Judgments.  
Here are some typical terms in L: 
 
X 
X.Y 
Move(x) 
Game(x, y).Move(x) 
Game(x, y):Score(x).2 
Game(x, y):Score(y).1 
In X.Y, we say X is the parent of X.Y. 
The complete expressions in L are the members of J – the complete 
judgments. Here are some examples of expressions in J: 
 ↑In(a, b) 
 ↓In(a, b) 
↓Game(x, y).WhoseMove(x) 
↓Game(x, y).Move(x) → ↑Play(x) 
↓Game(x, y).Move(x) ∧ ↓Play(y) → ↓Game(x, y).Fault(y) 
↓Game(x,y).Fault(y) → ↑Rebuke(x, y) 
 ↓See(x, ↑In(a, b)) 
 ↓See(y, ↓In(a, b)) 
 ↓In(a, b) → ↑See(x, ↓In(a, b)) 
 ↓See(x, ↑See(y, ↓In(a, b)) 
 
Here are some expressions which are not in J: 
 In(a, b) 
 ↑↑In(a, b) 
 ↓~F 
 ~↑F 
 ↓F ∨ ↓G 
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In L, there are four kinds of arrows between the two realms: 
↓X → ↓Y 
↓X → ↑Y 
↑X → ↑Y 
↑X → ↓Y 
L sees the world as divided into two planes, Up and Down, with arrows 
within and between the planes: 
 
Down
Up
Down
Up
 
 
11. Examples of Expressions in L 
 
We need a nice simple case to illustrate how L works. Here is one of Harvey 
Sacks’ favorite examples: “The baby cried. The mommy picked it up”: 
 
↓Cry(baby) 
 
The baby is crying 
↓See(mommy, ↓Cry(baby)) 
 
The mommy sees that 
the baby is crying 
↓See(mommy, ↓Cry(baby) → 
↑Pickup(mommy, baby)) 
 
The mommy sees that 
she should pick up the 
baby if it is crying 
↓See(mommy, ↑Pickup(mommy, 
baby)) 
 
The mommy sees that 
she should pick up the 
baby 
↓Pickup(mommy, baby) 
 
The mommy picks up 
the baby 
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The crucial move in this case is when the mommy realizes that the baby’s 
crying means that she should pickup the baby: 
 
↓See(mommy, ↓Cry(baby) → ↑Pickup(mommy, baby)) 
 
This is the mommy deriving an ought (↑) from an is (↓). Arrows between ↓ 
and ↑ are endemic in L.  
This first example provides no explanation for why the baby started 
crying. Was his crying an automatic response to wind, or was it a 
communicative act, expressing his need for attention and his desire to be 
picked up? At some point, toddlers move from the first to the second, and 
when they do, it is a profound conceptual shift. For example: 
 
↓See(toddler, ↓Lonely(toddler)) 
 
 
The toddler sees that he is 
lonely 
 
↓See(toddler, ↓Lonely(toddler)→ 
↑Pickup(mommy, toddler)) 
 
 
The toddler thinks that he 
should be picked up when he 
is lonely 
 
↓See(toddler, ↑Pickup(mommy, 
toddler) → ↑See(mommy, 
↑Pickup(mommy, toddler))) 
 
The toddler sees that mommy 
should realize that she should 
pick up the toddler if the 
toddler should be picked up 
↓See(toddler, ↑See(mommy, 
↑Pickup(mommy, toddler))) 
 
 
The toddler sees that the 
mommy should realize that 
she should pick up the toddler 
↓See(toddler, ↑See(mommy, 
↑Pickup(mommy, toddler)) → 
↑Show(toddler, mommy, 
↑Pickup(mommy, toddler))) 
 
 
The toddler sees that he 
should show mommy that he 
should be picked up if he 
wants her to see that he should 
be picked up 
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↓See(toddler, ↑Show(toddler, 
mommy, ↑Pickup(mommy, 
toddler))) 
 
 
The toddler realizes he has to 
show mommy that he should 
be picked up 
↓See(toddler, ↑Show(toddler, 
mommy, ↑Pickup(mommy, 
toddler)) → ↑Cry(toddler)) 
 
 
The toddler realizes that he 
should cry if he needs to show 
mommy that he should be 
picked up 
↓See(toddler, ↑Cry(toddler)) 
 
 
The toddler realizes he needs 
to cry 
 
One crucial move in this case is the toddler’s reasoning based on his 
understanding of what his mommy should see: 
↓See(toddler, ↑See(mommy, ↑Pickup(mommy, toddler))) 
The other critical move is when the toddler reasons from what his mommy 
should see to what he should show: 
↓See(toddler, ↑Show(toddler, mommy, ↑Pickup(mommy, toddler))) 
L was designed to express what people do and should do when they 
participate in such situations – how they see what others see and should see 
(in a pre-linguistic non-intensional sense of see) and how they communicate 
with each other (in a pre-linguistic sense of communication). 
 
 
11. How L is Different from Standard Deontic Logic 
 
L is very different from Standard Deontic Logic (SDL). SDL is a modal logic 
which extends propositional logic with a non-truth-functional operator O 
(Ought), which can apply to any sentence of SDL. 
The O operator has the usual axioms of a modal logic 
 
O(p→q) → (O(p) → O(q)) 
~(O(p) ∧ O(~p)) 
 
It has the usual inference rules of a modal logic 
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Modus Ponens 
Necessitation: if we can infer p, then we can infer O(p) 
 
Standard Deontic Logic isn’t really a logic of its own — it’s just a 
reinterpretation of a standard modal logic K+D, reinterpreting the box 
operator as Ought.  
There are four main differences between SDL and L. Firstly; L has no 
negation or disjunction. L tolerates no vagueness or indecision. Unlike SDL, 
it is a language of specific determinate claims. Secondly, SDL has the 
implication arrow ⇒ of material implication whereas L uses the → arrow of 
defeasible implication. Thirdly, SDL allows arbitrary iteration of O and P in 
sentences like O(O(P(q))), whereas in L, iteration of ↑/↓ is alternated with 
See/Show. Finally, SDL assumes an antecedently-intelligible core of 
declarative propositional sentences, whereas in L, ↑ and ↓ are coeval. I will 
elaborate on each of these. 
 
12. L is a determinate language containing no negation or disjunction 
 
L, unlike SDL, is a determinate language. If we want to say that x is not red 
in L, we have to say something specific about the color of x. Now the 
negation of p is the weakest claim which is incompatible with p, but L is 
interested in stronger claims.  
The disjunction of p and q is the strongest claim which is implied by both 
p and q. Disjunction is a general operation, which, applied to any two 
expressions, will yield the strongest claim which is vaguer than both. Like 
negation, disjunction is a vagueness-creating operator. In L there is no 
general operation on expressions which makes them vaguer. There is local 
vagueness: we can make a particular norm tree with local vagueness. A.B and 
A.C contain A, and A can imply Z. But this is much more determinate than B 
∨ C → Z 
The disjunction of p and q is the strongest claim which is entailed by both 
p and by q: 
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P Q
P Q
V
!
 
 
Recall that the parent of A.B is defined as A. Just as disjunction is the 
categorical sum in propositional logic, so the parent of an expression is the 
categorical sum in L. A.B is the strongest claim which is implied by both 
A.B.P and by A.B.Q: 
 
A.B.P A.B.Q
A.B
A
!
 
 
12. Defeasible implication 
 
The → arrow in L is defeasible implication, not material implication. 
Because material implication p ⇒ q is defined as equivalent to disjunction 
(~p ∨ q), and because we can always add extra disjuncts to a disjunction 
while preserving truth, we can move from (~p ∨ q) to (~p ∨ ~r ∨ q) which is 
equivalent to p ∨ r ⇒ q. Strengthening the input is always valid with 
material implication. 
Not so with defeasible implication. We cannot infer from 
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↓Bird(x) → ↓CanFly(x) 
to: 
 
↓Bird(x) ∧ ↓Penguin(x) → ↓CanFly(x) 
P → Q should be interpreted as: P means that Q, or: P provides a reason 
for Q. Adding arbitrary additional conjuncts does not preserve reason-
givingness. 
 
13. Iteration of ↑/↓ is alternated with See/Show 
 
Standard deontic logic allows iteration of O and P. E.g.  
O(O(O(q))) and P(P(P(q))) and O(P(O(q))) etc. 
It is unclear, at first glance, what sense to attach to O(O(q)). Like O(p ∨ 
q), it seems more of a product of the syntactic machinery of SDL than 
something which is antecedently intelligible. 
Likewise, SDL allows O outside →, so we can say O(p →q), as distinct 
from O(p) → O(q). L does not allow this: arrows in L cannot be prefixed with 
↑ or ↓. 
 
14. Up(↑) and Down(↓) are coeval, equiprimordial 
 
Deontic logics are formed by adding extra non truth-functional operators to 
a propositional logic. They are based on the assumption that there is a self-
contained practice of saying how the world is, and then – as an optional extra 
– we can say how the world should be. But I believe this deeply-ingrained 
assumption is false — there is no autonomous discursive practice5 in which 
all we can do is say how things are. This highly controversial claim needs 
justification. 
Inferentialists are fond of pointing out that we don’t understand an 
expression unless we know various inferences involving that term. Typically, 
we imagine inferences in the descriptive realm: inferences from what is the 
case to what is the case. But a stronger inferentialist claim is that we don’t 
understand an expression unless we can also inferentially connect it to what 
should be the case. This stronger claim is normative inferentialism: “You do 
not understand a claim unless you know (defeasible) inferences which 
                                                 
5 The term is Brandom’s: an autonomous discursive practice is a language-game you could play, 
though you played no other 
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(transitively) connect that claim to both the realms of what is the case (↓) 
and also what should be the case (↑).” 
I shall consider a number of examples which individually suggest 
normative inferentialism, to get the gentle reader in the mood, and then I will 
provide an argument for why all terms must be (indirectly) inferentially 
connected to Up – the realm of what should be the case. 
Our first example to support normative inferentialism is a standard 
functional term: “You don’t understand what a car is unless you know that: 
x is a car implies x should move forward when you press the right buttons.” 
Another example, of a functional term applied to a person: “You don’t 
understand what a firefighter is unless you know that: x is a firefighter 
implies x should put out the fire when there is a fire nearby.” 
The classic example of normative inferentialism is belief. Ascribing belief 
is implicitly normative: “You don’t understand what a belief that [y is red] is 
unless you know that: agent x believes that [y is red] implies x should believe 
that [y is colored].” 
What is true for material inferences is similarly true for material 
incompatibility relations: “You don’t understand what a belief that [y is red] 
is unless you know that: agent x believes that [y is red] implies x should not 
believe that [y is green].” 
Here is Brandom making the point about intentional states: “The starting 
point of his [Wittgenstein’s] investigations is the insight that our ordinary 
understanding of states and acts of meaning, understanding, intending, or 
believing something is an understanding of them as states and acts that 
commit or oblige us to act and think in various ways. The meaning of an 
linguistic expression must determine how it would be correct to use it in 
various contexts. [The content of a particular belief] determines how it is 
appropriate for it to be related. A particular intention may or may not settle 
how one will act, but its content determines how it is appropriate to act. 
[Making It Explicit, p. 13]” 
In response to cases like these, philosophers typically nod wisely, and say 
that these expressions are normative. But what is so special about these 
expressions? How do we know which subset of our language has this special 
normative import? Normative inferentialism is the generalization of this 
claim to all expressions.  
The strong and controversial claim which underpins L is that ↑ and ↓ are 
coeval – there is no autonomous discursive practice which involves only ↓. I 
have given examples of particular expressions which we don’t understand 
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unless we can inferentially connect them to ↑. But why should it hold for all 
expressions? 
The justification for normative inferentialism is that a collection of ↓ 
judgments, taken on their own, are completely inert. You can do nothing 
with them. We need ↑ judgments to connect to action! Recall the distinction 
between theories of practice which use capacities and theories which use 
norms. If we see practices as giving us new capacities, then we can believe in 
an independently intelligible realm of ↓, because it is our desires which can 
determine which capacities we follow. But if we see practices as giving us 
norms, we need to have at least one norm to act. So a term which had no 
inferential connection to the norms would have no effect on what we do – it 
would be inert: “A wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with 
it, is not part of the mechanism.” [Philosophical Investigations, §271] 
Someone who used a language which just involved ↓ expressions would be, 
in Dummett’s memorable phrase, an “intelligent and sentient tree”, who 
could observe the world and utter sounds, but could engage in no other type 
of action. But the situation is even worse than Dummett imagines, for the 
sentient tree could do nothing at all. Observing the world and uttering 
sounds are actions. You cannot perform an action unless you have a reason 
for action, and the sentient tree, which has no connection from ↓ to ↑, has 
none. 
What about an everyday term like “red”? What are the inferential 
connections between “red” and ↑? Here are a couple of inferential 
connections to ↑ which are very culturally-specific: 
 
 ↓Red(x) ∧ ↓TrafficLightControls(x, y) → ↑Stop(y) 
 ↓Bus(x) ∧ ↓London(x) → ↑Red(x) 
 
Now clearly it is possible to understand a term like “red” without knowing 
these particular inferential connections to Up, but – nevertheless – the claim 
is that you must know some inferential connections to Up, even if they are 
not these particular ones. 
The world is unavoidably a mixture of ↑ and ↓. We cannot get below to the 
solid ground of just ↓. This is what Wittgenstein meant when he wrote: 
“The difficult thing here is not, to dig down to the ground; no, it is to 
recognize the ground that lies before us as the ground.  For the ground keeps 
on giving us the illusory image of a greater depth, and when we seek to reach 
this, we keep on finding ourselves on the old level. Our disease is one of 
wanting to explain.” [Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, §30] 
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Wittgenstein is saying that the bedrock explanation is the world of two 
realms, descriptive and normative, and there is no deeper level, just in terms 
of the descriptive, which is self-sufficiently intelligible.  
The normative and the descriptive are, to use a well-worn expression, two 
sides of one coin: neither intelligible without the other.  
Wittgenstein’s well-known example of the builder6 might be interpreted as 
an example of an autonomous discursive practice involving ↑ but not ↓. In 
this example, the builder asks his assistance to bring objects of various types. 
The builder just says “Slab” (and in this case, he means ↑Slab), and the 
assistant brings the right type of object. Wittgenstein says “Conceive of this 
as a complete language game”. But suppose the assistant brings something 
that is not a slab. Then the builder will want to correct the helper. This 
correction will involve the builder getting the assistant to see that the thing 
he brought was not a slab. This involves ↓. Resolving failures of 
communication requires using both ↑ and ↓.  
 
 
15. How L Handles Some of the problems of Standard Deontic Logic 
15.1. Obligations of Disjunctions 
 
Because SDL extends propositional logic, and allows O to apply to any 
arbitrary propositional formula, it allows expressions like O(p ∨ q) and O(p 
→ q). Because it inherits its semantics from K+DL, the following are always 
valid: 
 
 O(p ∨ ~p) 
 O(p → p) 
 
We are obligated to make it the case that tautologies hold! This seems a 
heavy burden indeed. 
Further, SDL allows us to infer from O(p) to O(p ∨ q), for any arbitrary q 
— no matter how unsavory! 
The problem here is at the root, with the very sentences that SDL allows 
as syntactically acceptable. Just because a formal language accepts a certain 
sentence, it doesn’t mean that we can do anything with it, that we can make 
it mean anything. It is not clear what sense we could make of O(p ∨ q), O(p 
→ q) or O(O(p)). These are not formalized versions of expressions which are 
                                                 
6 Philosophical Investigations, §2 
Richard Evans 
 230
antecedently intelligible. It is rather that they are forced on us by the 
syntactic machinery of SDL, and we don’t know what to do with them. 
“Philosophers are often like little children who scribble some marks on a 
piece of paper and then ask the grown-up.” [“What does this mean?” Culture 
and Value, p. 17] 
Von Wright, the founder of deontic logic, originally had a formalism 
which was much more syntactically restricted. In this earlier version, the 
deontic operator (he started using P as primitive) was applied to actions, not 
to sentences. This meant that it was impossible to express O(p ∨ q), O(p → q) 
or O(O(p)). Under pressure from his colleagues, he moved to the formalism 
we now know as SDL.  
The contested expressions O(p ∨ q), O(p → q) and O(O(p)) are not allowed 
in L. In L, there is no disjunction whatsoever, so we cannot even express O(p 
∨ q) at all. Further, in L, expressions of the form p → q cannot be embedded 
inside ↑, so we cannot say ↑(p → q). This syntactic minimalism is a virtue. In 
this respect, L is intermediate between Von Wright’s original logic (where 
deontic operators were applied to actions) and his later logic (where deontic 
operators were applied to arbitrarily complex logical propositions). 
15.2. Chisholm’s puzzle 
 
Standard Deontic Logic has a number of problems when it tries to handle 
cases involving contrary-to-duty conditionals (cases which include an if-then 
clause in which the antecedent involves violating a norm). 
Consider the following example: 
 
1. It ought to be that a certain man goes to the assistance of his 
neighbors 
2. It ought to be that if he does go, then he ought to tell them he 
is coming 
3. If he does not go, then he ought not tell them he is coming 
4. He does not go 
 
The intuitive conclusion is: 
 
5. He ought not tell them he is coming 
 
These sentences all seem to be logically independent: no one of them 
follows from the others.  
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The trouble is there is no plausible translation of these sentences into 
standard deontic logic, which yields the intended conclusion and which 
preserves their logical independence.  
The obvious translation is: 
 
 O(A) 
 O(A→ T) 
 ~A → O(~T) 
 ~A 
 
(Where A is the man assists the neighbors, and T is the man tells them he 
is coming). 
In this translation, we can derive both O(T) and O(~T) – a contradiction. 
The only other plausible translation doesn’t fare much better: 
 
 O(A) 
 A→ O(T) 
 ~A → O(~T) 
 ~A 
 
This no longer yields a contradiction, but it loses the independence of the 
four propositions. Now the second is a direct consequence of the fourth 
(because the arrow of Standard Deontic Logic is the arrow of material 
implication, where p → q is equivalent to ~p ∨ q, which follows directly from 
~p). 
We have no such problem in L, because the arrow in L is the arrow of 
defeasible implication, not the arrow of material implication. In L, this 
situation is modeled as: 
 
 ↑ A 
 ↓ A → ↑T 
 ↓~A → ↑~T 
↓~A 
 
(Note we are using local negation ~ as syntactic sugar). 
In this formulation, ↑~T follows as we should expect. Further, the four 
sentences are independent: ↓A → ↑T does not follow from ↓~A.  
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16. Two senses of permission 
 
Two distinct notions of permission have been distinguished in the deontic 
logic literature. The trouble is that standard deontic logic can only express 
one of them. 
If agent x is weakly-permitted to do A, then there is no reason why he 
shouldn’t do A. Weak permission is inter-definable with obligation: 
 
 O(x, A) iff ~P(x, ~A) 
 
To say that agent x is strongly-permitted to do A, by contrast, is to say 
more than just that he is weakly permitted. It is to say that someone or 
something actually permitted him to do it – an action was performed that 
showed everyone that it was ok for him to do it. Strong permission effectively 
forbids any future legislation which rules out the doing of A. Weak 
permission looks to the past, whereas strong permission is itself normative 
over the future. 
Strong permission cannot be expressed in Standard Deontic Logic – but 
we can express both concepts naturally in L: 
 
↓WeaklyPermitted(x, A) iff ↓~See(x, ↑~Perform(x, A)) 
 
↓StronglyPermitted(x, A) iff ↑~See(y, ↑~Perform(x, A)), for all 
y 
 
If I am weakly permitted to do A, then I can’t see any reason why I 
shouldn’t perform A. But if I am strongly permitted to do A, then nobody 
should think I shouldn’t do A. 
 
17. Reasoning with Conditional Norms 
 
Input/Output logic was introduced to handle the sorts of problems we have 
been outlining with Standard Deontic Logic. Input/Output logic uses a 
different notation from L. It does not have any deontic operators like O or ↑ 
— it just has propositions and conditions. An inference from a to b is 
represented as (a, b). 
Input/Output logic avoids most of the puzzles associated with standard 
deontic logic, but it introduces different problems of its own. Most 
notoriously, if we have two conditions (a,x) and (x,y), should we be able to 
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infer (a,y)? There are certain examples where the inference is clearly invalid. 
Suppose we have: 
 
a I owe my neighbor $10 
x I pay him back $10 
y My neighbor thanks me 
 
If we let the inference go through, we will conclude that if I owe my 
neighbor $10, he should thank me. But shouldn’t he only thank me if I have 
in fact paid him, not just because I should pay him? 
L diagnoses the problem here as a reflection of the impoverishment of 
Input/Output logic’s expressive resources. Input/Output logic cannot 
distinguish between something being the case, and something that should be 
the case. But in L we can distinguish between  
 
↓A→ ↑X 
↑X→ ↑Y 
 
and: 
 
↓A→ ↑X 
↓X→ ↑Y 
 
In the first pattern, the inference is perfectly valid. In the second pattern, 
the inference is invalid. The example of the $10 debt falls squarely under the 
second pattern. 
 
18. Using L to Express the Situations We Find Ourselves In 
 
So far we have introduced and motivated a formal language, L, for describing 
what people do and should do. We have done the work of introducing and 
motivating the language, and now it is pay-back time — What do we gain by 
using L? What can we say in it? 
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18.1. Expressing Directions of Fit in L 
 
In Foundations of Illocutionary Logic, Searle writes: “In spite of frequent 
philosophical protestations7 to the contrary, there is a rather limited number 
of things one can do with language.” 
He uses the notion of direction-of-fit: “Intuitively the idea of the direction 
of fit of an utterance can be clarified by pointing out that if the propositional 
content fails to match reality, one side or the other is at fault. If my 
statement fails to match reality, it is my statement and not reality that is at 
fault. Statements can be said to be true or false, and statements and other 
members of the assertive class are said to have the word-to-world direction of 
fit. But if my order is disobeyed or my promise is not carried out, it is not my 
order or promise which is at fault but rather reality in the person of the 
hearer who disobeyed the order or myself who failed to carry out the promise. 
Such utterances are said to have the world-to-word direction of fit.” 
He says there are exactly four directions of fit: 
 
1. The word-to-world direction of fit. 
In achieving success of fit, the propositional content of the 
illocution fits an existing state of affairs in the world. 
2. The world-to-word direction of fit. 
In achieving success of fit, the world is altered to fit the 
propositional content of the illocution. 
3. The double direction of fit. 
In achieving success of fit the world is altered to fit the 
propositional content by representing the world as being so 
altered. 
4. The null or empty direction of fit. 
There is no question of achieving success of fit between the 
propositional content and the world, because in general success 
of fit is presupposed by the utterance. 
 
                                                 
7 See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §23 
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The double-direction of fit is prima-facie puzzling. For the two 
straightforward directions of fit make sense because we know what should be 
altered when the words and world are out of sync. In a word-to-world 
direction of fit, the words should be altered. In a world-to-word direction of 
fit, the world should be altered. But in a double-direction of fit, what should 
be altered now?  
When we express these directions of fit in L, this initial puzzlement 
subsides. 
All speech-acts are done for the reason of showing something. All speech-
acts satisfy the expression: 
 
↑Show(x, y, _) → ↑Do(x, P) 
 
In other words, one reason for x performing the speech act P is to show y 
something. 
What sort of expressions can fill the blank in this formula? The different 
ways of filling the blank will correspond to the different directions of fit of 
utterances. For example: 
 
Direction Intention-in-action 
Word-to-
World 
↑Show(x, y, ↓N) → ↑Do(x, P) 
World-to-
Word 
↑Show(x, y, ↑N) → ↑Do(x, P) 
Double ↑Show(x, y, ↓Do(x, P) → ↑N) → ↑Do(x, P) 
Null ↑Show(x, y, ↓N → ↑Do(x, P)) → ↑Do(x, P) 
 
In the word-to-world direction of fit, agent x should do action P because 
he needs to show y that N is the case. For example, the agent’s P action is his 
saying to y that “there is a storm coming”, and ↓N is the fact that the storm 
is coming.  
In the world-to-word case, agent x should do P because he needs to show 
agent y that N should be the case. For example, the agent’s P action is his 
saying “slab” to y, and ↑N is that y should bring a slab.  
 
18.2. Expressing the Double Direction of Fit in L 
 
In the case of the double-direction of fit, L allows us to see clearly the two 
different arrows involved: agent x should perform P because he needs to show 
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y that, by the very performance of P, he is making it the case that N should be 
the case: 
 
↑Show(x, y, ↓Do(x, P) → ↑N) → ↑Do(x, P) 
 
Searle considers status-assignments of the form: 
 
X counts as Y in C 
 
For example: “Saying “I appoint you chairman” means that you are the 
chairman if spoken by someone with the appropriate authority in the context 
of an appointment-ceremony. A normative consequence of this status of 
being a chairman is: if you are chairman, then you are responsible for 
opening the next meeting.” [The Construction of Social Reality, p.54] 
In L, this would be rendered: 
 
↓Do(x, X) ∧ ↓C → ↓Y(y) 
 
In our example, the X action which makes it the case that the Y status 
holds is itself a speech-act. In such cases, the X action is a performative and 
has the double-direction of fit described above: 
 
↑Show(x, y, ↓Say(x, y, “I appoint you chairman”)) → 
↓Chairman(y))  
→ ↑ Say(x, y, “I appoint you chairman”) 
 
In other words: the reason why I say “I appoint you chairman” is to show 
you that, by the very act of saying those words, I have appointed you 
chairman. 
These new statuses have normative consequences. In our example: 
 
↓Chairman (y) → ↑OpenMeeting(y) 
 
This is the general logical form of status-function declarations: 
 
↑Show(x, y, ↓Do(x, P) → ↓N) → ↑Do(x, P) 
↑Show(x, y, ↓Do(x, P) → ↑N) → ↑Do(x, P) 
 
We have two types, depending on whether N is in Up (↑) or Down (↓). 
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18.3. Expressing the “Null” Direction of Fit in L 
 
In the case of the null8 direction of fit, Searle says that the action presupposes 
the truth of a claim, but does not assert it. For example: thanking somebody 
after a marvelous dinner is an act which presupposes the dinner, but does not 
assert its existence (or its marvelousness). This sort of example is rendered in 
L as: 
 
↑Show(x, y, ↓N → ↑Do(x, P)) → ↑Do(x, P) 
 
One of our reasons for doing P is to show that our doing P was prompted 
by N being the case. For example: I thanked my host for the meal in order to 
show her that the marvelous meal prompted my thanking. Or: I apologized 
in order to show that my being late meant that I needed to apologize9: 
 
↑Show(x, y, ↓Late(x) → ↑Apologize(x, y)) → ↑Apologize(x, y) 
 
18.4. Expressing Iteration in L 
 
Searle stresses that the structure “X counts as Y in C” can be iterated: “In 
such cases the X term at a higher level can be a Y term from an earlier level. 
For example, only a citizen of the United States as X can become a President 
as Y, but to be a citizen is to have a Y status function from an earlier level. It 
is no exaggeration to say that these iterations provide the logical structure of 
complex societies. [The Construction of Social Reality, p.80] 
This sort of iteration can be described simply in L: 
 
↓BornLegallyIn (x, c) → ↓Citizen(x, c) 
↓Citizen(x, c) ∧ ↓WinsElection(x, c) → ↓President(x, c) 
                                                 
8 Searle has recently revised his terminology – instead of calling it the “null” direction of fit, he 
now calls it the presuppositional direction of fit. For the reasons given in the text below, this 
terminological change is a nice improvement.  
9 This analysis is not meant as an analysis of apologizing. It does not, after all, capture the 
sincerity condition at the heart of the apology – that the speaker is expressing his regret. 
Instead of giving an analysis, we are locating the apology within the space of norms by giving a 
reason for the action: one of the reasons for making the apology was to show that the situation 
warranted the apology. 
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Each of these Y terms has deontic responsibilities: 
 
 ↓Citizen(x, c) → ↑PayTaxes(x, c) 
 ↓President(x, c) → ↑ProtectInterestsOf(x, c) 
 
This sort of iteration is arrow iteration, which involves inferences using the 
transitivity of →. 
But there is also another type of iteration available in L. This is iteration 
within the epistemic operators See/Show and the arrows ↑/↓. When 
performing a linguistic act, we are always showing something. So let us look at 
all possible expressions of the form  
 
↑Show(x, y, _) → ↑Do(x, P) 
 
Because L has recursive structure, there is an indefinite number of 
expressions which can be placed in the blank. Here is a small fragment of the 
expansion tree: 
  
 
Note that Searle’s four directions of fit occur in this expansion tree, 
represented in bold. But these are four expressions amongst indefinitely 
many others. 
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19. Describing the Game of Giving and Asking for Reasons in L 
 
In Making It Explicit, Robert Brandom produced a remarkably specific 
description of the structure of the social practices needed to institute 
language-understanding. Following Sellars, he called this practice the Game 
of Giving and Asking for Reasons (GOGAR). Like Sellars, he uses the core 
notions of material inference and material incompatibility, but he goes 
further in distinguishing two fundamental deontic statuses: Commitment and 
Entitlement. Commitment tracks the sentences which a speaker is committed 
to, and Entitlement tracks the sentences which the agent doesn’t need to 
justify. In chapter 3 of Making It Explicit, he describes some clear rules for 
how to update Commitment and Entitlement as speakers make claims. 
We can re-describe GOGAR in L. Here are the terms needed: 
 
Assert (x, p) Agent x has asserted sentence p 
CommittedTo(x, p) Agent x has committed to p 
EntitledTo(x, p) Agent x is entitled to p 
CommitmentImplies 
(p, q) 
There is a commitment-
preserving material inference 
from sentence p to q 
EntitlementImplies(p, 
q) 
There is an entitlement-
preserving material inference 
from p to q 
Incompatible(p, q) Sentence p and q are materially 
incompatible 
Justify(x, p, q) Agent x has justified p with q 
Retract(x, p) Agent x has retracted his 
assertion that p 
 
Here are the update rules of GOGAR as described in Making It Explicit, 
chapter 3: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard Evans 
 240
↓Assert(x, p) → ↓Committed(x, p) 
 
If agent x asserts sentence p, then he is committed to p 
↓Committed(x, p) ∧ ↓Commitment Implies(p, q) → 
↓Committed(x, p) 
 
If agent x asserts sentence p, and p materially implies q, then he is 
also committed to q 
↓Committed(x, p) → ↓Entitled(x, p) 
 
By default, agents are entitled to their commitments 
↓Committed(x, p) ∧ ↓Committed(y, q) ∧ ↓Incompatible (p, q) ∧ 
↓Entitled(x, p) → ↓~Entitled(y, q) 
 
If two claims are incompatible, the two agents asserting them 
cannot be entitled to both10 
↓Committed(x, p) → ↑Entitled(x, p) 
 
If an agent is committed to a claim, then he should be entitled to it 
↑Entitled(x, p) ∧ ↓CommitmentImplies(q, p) ∧ ↓Entitled(x, q) 
→ ↑Justify(x, q, p) 
 
If an agent needs to justify p, and he is already entitled to a claim q 
which commitment-implies p, then he should justify p with q 
↓Committed(x, p) ∧ ↓~Entitled(x, p) → ↑Retract(x, p) 
 
If an agent is committed to a claim he is not entitled to, he should 
retract it 
 
 
Note in the interests of space, we have simplified the discussion to include 
only inferences from one statement to another (when in fact the input to an 
inference is a set of statements), and incompatibility between pairs of 
sentences (when in fact incompatibility can be between sets of more than two 
sentences). 
 
                                                 
10 We have used a slightly difference conception of entitlement from Brandom: he analyzes 
incompatibility between p and q as: Commitment to p precludes Entitlement to q. 
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20. Expressing Phenomenological Detail in L 
 
Garfinkel uses a number of practical examples to show his students how 
traditional sociological method passes over the phenomenological detail of 
the local situation. One particularly striking example is the summoning 
phones. He is emphatic that you can only truly understand this example by 
participating in it, not just by reading about it. Nevertheless I will re-
describe it in text, hoping powerlessly that the gentle reader will actually try 
it for himself.  
He asks his students to tape-record five different types of phone-call: 
 
• A phone summoning you 
• A phone summoning another 
• A phone simulating summoning you (a case where you have 
asked someone to ring you on your phone at a specified time, 
for the purpose of tape-recording the noise, but you have no 
intention of answering) 
• A phone simulating summoning another 
• A phone which is just ringing, summoning nobody 
 
Each student is asked to tape record five examples of each of the five 
types of phone-call, and bring them to the next class. Then, when the class 
begins, Garfinkel produces his own tape and plays some examples: here is an 
example of a phone summoning me; later, here is one of a phone simulating 
summoning another.  
Of course, when played back, all the tape-recorded phone-calls sound the 
same. The phenomenological detail has been lost. Garfinkel specifies exactly 
what has been lost. 
When the phone is summoning me, the first silence (the silence before the 
first ring is heard) isn’t heard until the first ring is heard. The first ring is 
heard coming out of a silence that is only now hearable as preceding it. When 
it is heard, the first ring is directed to a fixed place ahead: the moment of the 
second ring. Further: when the first ring is heard, it is hearably summoning 
me: I see that I should answer it. That I should answer it is observable to me 
and to others. 
When the phone is summoning another, what makes it sound different, to 
me and to others, is that it is observable that another should answer it. The 
phenomenological difference corresponds exactly to a difference in the 
normative status. 
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When the phone is simulating summoning me (when I have prearranged 
with someone else that they will phone me at this particular time), it feels 
very different: this time I am aware of the initial silence (the silence before 
the first ring) from the very start, because I know that my friend is going to 
ring me, and I am anticipating that first ring. When the first ring comes, I do 
not hear it summoning me – I do not see that I should answer it – it is just 
ringing. The phone simulating summoning another is similar. 
When the phone is ringing, but not ringing for anybody in particular, the 
phenomenological details are different again: the initial silence is not 
anticipated – we did not expect it to ring. When it rings for the first time, 
this ring has no normative import: nobody should answer it. 
A phone summoning you sounds very different from one which is 
summoning another. This phenomenological difference can be captured very 
precisely in L: it is the difference between seeing that ↑Pickup(phone, me) 
and ↑Pickup(phone, other). A phone summoning you sounds very different 
from a phone simulating sounding you; this phenomenological difference, too, 
can be captured exactly in L: it is the difference between ↑Pickup(phone, me) 
and ↑See(me, ↑Ring(phone)). 
The phenomenological differences are summarized in the table: 
 
 Silence First Ring 
Summoning me  ↑Pickup(phone, me) 
Summoning another  ↑Pickup(phone, other). 
Simulating summoning 
me 
↑See(me, 
↑Ring(phone)) 
 
Simulating summoning 
another 
↑See(other, 
↑Ring(phone)) 
 
Phone just ringing   
 
Let’s abandon caution for a moment. Generalizing wildly and 
irresponsibly from this simple example – what if all phenomenological 
differences were differences in how the normative was perceived? 
What if feeling a desire to X based on a ground P just is perceiving that 
one should X if P? For example, the felt urgency of hunger is captured by: 
 
↓See(↓EmptyStomach(me) → ↑Eat(me, carrot)) 
 
In this approach, desires are explained by norms, not norms by desires. In 
this approach, there is a normative judgment behind every desire, but there 
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are also normative judgments that do not correspond to desires at all. As 
Searle puts the point: “What we have in society is a set of deontic power 
relations. But again, one might ask the question, why should we care about 
these deontic power relations? Who gives a damn about my rights, duties and 
obligations? The answer is important: What we are discussing here are 
reasons for action, and to recognize something as a right, duty, obligation, 
requirement, etc is to recognize a reason for action. Furthermore it is a 
specific kind of reason for action that is absolutely essential to human society 
and which, as far as I can tell, does not exist in the animal kingdom: These 
deontic structures make possible desire-independent reasons for action. [Social 
Ontology: Some Basic Principles, p.10] 
In Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas distinguishes four types of 
action: teleological (instrumental, desire-based), normative, dramaturgical 
(expressing one’s internal self-image), and communicative. What are the 
explanatory relations between these four types of action? Are they 
equiprimordial, or can one explain the others? According to the Humeans, 
the teleological explains the others: there is no action done according to a 
norm unless there was a desire to follow that norm; there is no action to 
express oneself unless there is desire to express oneself, and there is no 
communicative action unless there is a desire to communicate. But according 
to Kant and Searle, and the position being outlined here, it is the normative 
which explains the others: in particular, there is no desire to p unless and 
because one sees that one should p. In this picture, the normative is the 
explanatorily fundamental type of action, and the others (teleological, 
dramaturgical and communicative) are explained in terms of it.  
If the felt urgency of desire can be expressed in L, can the hurtfulness of a 
pain also be expressed?  
Consider the following sentence in L, with a free sentential variable X: 
 
↓DamagedElbow(me) → ↑See(X) 
 
Now if this sentence is applied to itself, so that we substitute that very 
sentence for X, we get: 
 
↓DamagedElbow(me) ) → ↑See(↓DamagedElbow(me) →  
↑See(↓DamagedElbow(me) → ↑See(↓DamagedElbow(me) → … 
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This is a fixed-point. Having the pain just is seeing that the damaged 
elbow means I should notice it (where it = seeing that the damaged elbow 
means I should notice it).  
Daniel Dennett has a similar understanding of the phenomenology of 
pain: “A less commonly recognized home remedy for pain is not to distract, 
but to concentrate one’s attention on the pain. I discovered this for myself in 
the dentist’s chair, thinking to take advantage of the occasion by performing 
a phenomenological investigation without the benefit of Novocain, and have 
since learned that this is a highly elaborated technique of Zen Buddhism. I 
recommend this enthusiastically. If you can make yourself study your pains 
(even quite intense pains) you will find, as it were, no room left to mind them: 
(they stop hurting) – though studying a pain (e.g. a headache) gets boring 
pretty fast, and as soon as you stop studying them, they come back and hurt. 
[Why You Can’t Make a Computer That Feels Pain] 
Here is a slogan for this general strategy of explaining phenomenological 
detail in terms of perception of the normative: feeling the urgency just is 
seeing the should. 
 
 
21. Comparison with Other Approaches 
 
This approach was inspired by the various writings of Garfinkel, Searle, 
Brandom, and the deontic logic literature.  
This approach is like Garfinkel’s in that it takes seriously the fact that the 
social practices which we take for granted are the result of a complex ongoing 
achievement. Because we are all (most of us, most of the time, anyway) so 
effortlessly good at participating in and co-creating these practices, the work 
required to maintain these practices is unnoticed by us, in the same way that 
we do not notice the work needed to maintain balance as we walk. But it is 
unlike Garfinkel’s in that it is trying to create a formal recursive language in 
which to decompose the elements of social participation into a few simple 
building blocks. 
This approach is like Searle’s in that it is trying to find the building blocks 
out of which social practices are composed. It is also like Searle’s in using 
normative judgments to explain desires, and not vice versa. It is also like 
Searle’s in seeing status-function declarations as fundamental to the ongoing 
construction of social practice. 
But this approach is unlike Searle’s in that it involves a recursive 
structure in which there is an indefinite number of sentence forms, not just 
four types of direction of fit. The four directions of fit which Searle points out 
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are indeed central examples, but they are not the only examples. Another 
point of difference is that this approach takes as primary an individual’s 
seeing, rather than a collective’s seeing. In this respect, I side with Brandom 
and Garfinkel: the notion of “we” is not something that can be taken for 
granted in the beginning of the theory, but something that has to be achieved.  
This approach is like Brandom’s in that it attempts to explain language in 
terms of practice. It is also like Brandom’s in taking the notion of material 
inference and material incompatibility as prior to logical notions of 
entailment and negation. Like Brandom, it assumes an “I-Thou” conception 
of practice, rather than an “I-We” conception of practice. 
But it is unlike Brandom’s in that it begins with the idea that declarative 
word-to-world statements cannot on their own form an autonomous 
discursive practice, a language game you could play though you played no 
other. Brandom’s GOGAR is a language solely involving ↓, whereas L is a 
language in which ↓ and ↑ are accorded equal status. 
This approach is like deontic logic in that it is a formal language for 
representing norms. But it is unlike deontic logic in that it is fully 
determinate: there are no negations or disjunctions. It also differs from deontic 
logic in refusing to allow iterated embedding, like O(O(p)) – the only iterated 
embedding allowed is when ↓/↑ are alternated with See/Show.  
 
 
22. Summary 
 
I have introduced a formal (but pre-logical) language for describing what 
people do and should do when they participate in practices. I have shown 
examples of how L can be used to express rule-following, queuing, Garfinkel’s 
summoning-phones, and sketched how it could be used to describe the Game 
of Giving and Asking for Reasons. 
The explanandum was our capacity to participate in an indefinite variety 
of practices. The approach taken was to provide a combinatorial reduction of 
the indefinite variety of ways in which we can participate in practices to a 
few simple recursive constructs. But it is not a reduction from the normative 
to the non-normative. The explanans is irreducibly normative.  
I am not, of course, claiming that people have sentences of L inside their 
head which they manipulate in order to understand and participate in 
practices. What I am saying is that L allows us to describe what people are 
doing and what they should do when they participate in practices. L 
describes the pattern – both what it is and what it should be. It follows that 
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if the agent were, per impossibile, to manipulate internal representations of 
sentences of L in an internalized language of practice, then he would be able 
to competently participate in our practices.  
L is a language of practice, not a language of thought. 
L is a language of practice, based on Kantian, Wittgenstinian and 
ethnomethodological considerations.  
L is Kantian in that what it is to be an agent is to be committed to trying 
to see the truth. There is an inferential link from what is the case to what the 
agent should see: 
 
P → ↑See(x, P) 
 
This schema has two instances. Agents should see what is the case, but 
they also need to see what should be the case: 
 
↓N → ↑See(x, ↓N) 
↑N → ↑See(x, ↑N) 
 
L is Searlean and Wittgenstinian and ethnomethodological in that 
participants in a scene are continually responsible for manifesting the current 
state of the situation. The central insight is that the participants are 
continually accountable, and that they are continually giving the situation 
intelligibility by giving an account of their actions. 
As Garfinkel puts it: “The ways in which the orderlinesses of the order of 
service are produced and managed are identical with the ways in which those 
orderlinesses are made accountable.” 
Making something accountable is showing that you should have done it. 
Garfinkel is saying that we produce the intelligibility of the social scene by 
showing the norms to each other. This central insight can itself be 
expressed directly in L: 
 
↓Do(x, a) → ↓Accountable(x, a) 
 
↓Accountable(x, a) → ↑Show(x, y, ↑Do(x,a)) 
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Appendix A: Formal Definition of L 
 
1. The Syntax of L 
 
L is defined according to the rules: 
 
States S ::= F | F(x1, …, xn)  
Terms T ::= S | S.T | S:T 
Expressions E ::= T | See(x, J) | Show(x, y, J) 
Deontic Formulae D ::= ↑E | ↓E 
Conjunctions C ::= D | D ∧ C 
Judgments J ::= C | C → C 
 
Here 
• F is a function term, and x1, …, xn are terms referring to 
individual objects.  
• S.T and S:T are ways of specifying sub-states of S, so we can 
build trees of expressions. In S.T, T is the unique child of S, in 
S:T, we are saying that T is one of the children of S, but there 
may be many others.  
• ↑E says that E should be the case. ↓E says that E actually is 
the case.  
• See is the term in L for scorekeeping the state of the practice. 
See(x, J) means that agent x sees that J. J itself may be either 
normative (↑) or descriptive (↓). 
• Show is the term in L for manifesting the state of the practice. 
Show(x, y, J) means that agent x shows agent y that J. 
Again, J itself may be either normative or descriptive. 
 
2. Inference Rules for L 
 
The inference-rules come from a restricted version of input-output logic: 
 
Weakening 
Output 
From A → X and X implies Y, infer A → Y 
Transitivity From A → X and A ∧ X → Y, infer A → Y 
Conjunction From A → X and A → Y, infer A → X ∧ Y 
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Output 
Equivalent 
Input 
From A → X and A iff B, infer B → X 
 
This is a restricted version of input-output logic, in that we expressly do 
not have the following inference rules: 
 
Strengthening 
Input 
From A → X and B implies A, infer B → X 
Disjunction 
Output 
From A → X, infer A → X ∨ Y 
 
We don’t allow Input Strengthening, because we want our arrow to 
represent defeasible implication – the sort of implication we use when we say if 
x is a bird, then x can fly (but if x is a bird and x is a penguin, then x can’t 
fly). We don’t allow disjunction output because disjunction is not an operator 
in L. There is no place for wishy-washy indeterminate claims like disjunction 
in a determinate language. 
We also have the following axioms: 
 
Generalized 
Throughput 
↓A.B → ↓A  
↑A.B → ↑A  
See-to-Show ↑See(y, P) → ↑Show(x, y, P) 
Show-to-See ↓Show(x, y, P) → ↓See(y, P) 
 
We also have the following inference rules for See: 
 
Modus Ponens φ See(x, P) ∧ φ See(x, P→Q) → φ See(x, Q) 
Transitivity φ See(x, P→Q) ∧ φ See(x, Q→R) → φ See(x, 
P→R) 
Conjunction 
Output 
φ See(x, P→ Q) ∧ φ See(x, P → R) → φ 
See(x, P → Q ∧ R) 
Generalized 
Throughput  
φ See(x, ↓A.B → ↓A)  
φ See(x, ↑A.B → ↑A) 
 
Where φ is ↑ or ↓ and P,Q, R are ↑E or ↓E for some expression E. 
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We also need axioms to express the (defeasible) two-way inferences 
between what is the case and what I should see. 
 
I should see what is the case P → ↑See(x, P) 
If I should see it, then it is the case ↑See(x, P) → P 
 
3. Incompatibility in L 
 
One of the striking things about L is that instead of having a symbol for 
logical negation, it incorporates the determinate concept of incompatibility.  
Two claims are incompatible in L if they have a common part which is 
post-fixed with “.” but are different after the “.” 
Examples: 
 
Compatible Incompatible 
X and Y A.X and A.Y 
F(a) and F(b) H.F(a) and H.F(b) 
A.B and A.B.C A.B and A.C.D 
A:B and A:C A:B.C and A:B.D 
 
X and Y are incompatible iff there exists an A, B, C such that X = A +.+ 
B and Y = A +.+ C and B ≠ C 
 
3. Incompatibility Resolution 
 
When using L in a real setting, the defeasible inferences involving → will 
issue in heaps of incompatible claims, which need to be resolved. There will 
be incompatibilities in both realms – in Up as well as in Down. How should 
we resolve between incompatible claims? 
If X and Y are incompatible, we can choose to choose X over Y if our 
reasons for X are a superset of our reasons for Y. 
Note that this only works because we are using defeasible implication 
which doesn’t allow Input Strengthening. 
Note that incompatibility resolution works just the same with ↑ and ↓. 
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4. Extending 
 
To define the semantics of L, we need the concept of one term extending 
another. For example: A.B extends A. 
 
X extends Y iff there exists a term Z such that X = Y.Z 
 
5. Semantics for L 
 
Define a world as a triple <Up, Down, Arrows>, where Up and Down are 
planes, and Arrows is a collection of arrows between the planes. 
 
Down
Up
 
 
Define a plane as a triple <V, R, W> where  
 
V : T → bool is a valuation of terms 
R : Agent → World × World → bool is a relation on worlds, one 
for each agent 
W is the world in which the plane resides. 
 
Rules for how judgments are satisfied by worlds: 
 
w ≤ ↑E iff w.Up ≤ E 
w ≤ ↓E iff w.Down ≤ E 
w ≤ X → Y iff X → Y ∈ Arrows or ∃Z. w ≤ X → Z and w ≤ Z → 
Y 
w ≤ X ∧ Y iff w ≤ X and w ≤ Y 
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Rules for how expressions are satisfied by planes: 
 
p ≤ T iff ∃ R. Extends(R, T) and p.V(R)  
or ∃ Q → R ∈ p.W.Arrows such that p ≤ Q  
p ≤ See(x, P) iff ∀ w’. P.Rx(p.W, w’) → w’ ≤ P 
 
 
This form of semantics is related to input/output semantics in that the 
domain of interpretation itself contains a set of conditionals.  
Note that we have no semantic rules for Show. Instead, Show is 
interpreted according to the inference-rules above: 
 
See-to-Show ↑See(y, P) → ↑Show(x, y, P) 
Show-to-See ↓Show(x, y, P) → ↓See(y, P) 
 
6. Syntactic Sugar: Local Negation 
 
It is useful to introduce some syntactic sugar to L. We introduce local 
negation to make the expressions simpler and more readable, but it is entirely 
inessential – it can be replaced without loss of expressive power.  
Although I have been stressing that L does not contain an operator for 
negation, we can add a form of local negation within a term. 
If we have a state T which we want to be able to negate, introduce two 
new terms T.True and T.False. Replace T with T.True and introduce ~T for 
T.False. This negated state is allowed only as the right-most state in a “.” 
term. This allows us to write things like: 
 
A.B.~C 
But it does not allow us to write 
 
~A.B.C 
The reason for disallowing this sort of expression is that it is indeterminate: 
we do not know if ~A.B.C is true because we are actually in A.D, or because 
we are in A.B.E.  
 
Richard Evans 
 252
Appendix B: Describing Queuing in L 
 
 
Recall that participants in a queue are continually seeing and showing their 
positions in line. They are continually preoccupied with place-work. In this 
section we express a simple queue in L. 
In this example there is a distinguished object t which is what the 
participants are queuing to use. I will use x, y, z to range over agents. I will 
use ⊥ to denote the null object, so we can say After(x).Is(⊥) to express that 
there is nobody behind x. I will use ♣ to denote the null conjunction (which 
is always true). 
 
Terms: 
 
• Queue(t):Member(x).In – x is in the queue parameterized by 
object t. There is an incompatible term, 
Queue(t):Member(x).Out, which expresses that x is not in the 
queue. 
• Queue(t):After(x).Is(y) — y is after x in the queue 
parameterized by object t. Note that there can only be one 
person in the queue after x because After(x).Is(y) and 
After(x).Is(z) are incompatible. 
• Queue(t):Violation(x) – x has performed a violation 
• StandBehind(x, y) — x is standing behind y. This relational 
term supports many different people standing behind x at 
once: StandBehind(x,y) is compatible with StandBehind(z,y) 
• User(x).Is(y) – y is the user of x. Note again that 
User(x).Is(y) is incompatible with User(x).Is(z) – there is only 
one user of x at a time. 
• Use(x, y) – y uses x. This relational term supports many 
different people using x at once. 
 
Note that because Member, After and Violation are prefixed by a 
Queue(t) object, x can be in one queue while not being in another, and x can 
be behind y in one queue while simultaneously being in front of y in another 
queue. But to make the rules shorter and simpler, I will suppress the 
Queue(t) prefix in what follows.  
 
Rules for Joining and Leaving the Queue: 
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1. ↑Use(t, x) ∧ ↓Member(x).Out → ↑After(x).Is(⊥) 
 
If someone should use t and he is not already in the queue, then he 
should get to the back of the queue 
2. ♣ → ↓Member(x).Out 
 
By default, everyone starts off outside the queue 
3. ♣ → ↓After(t).Is(⊥) 
 
By default, the queue starts off empty 
4. ↑ After(x).Is(⊥) ∧ ↓After(y).Is(z) → ↑See(x, ↓After(y).Is(z)) 
 
The person who has to get to the back of the queue has a 
responsibility to see where everybody is placed 
5. ↑ After(x).Is(⊥) ∧ ↓After(y).Is(⊥) → ↑After(y).Is(x) 
 
The person who has to get to the back should be placed behind the 
last person 
6. ↑After(y).Is(x) → ↑Show(x,z, ↓After(y).Is(x)) 
 
If x needs to be behind y, then he must show others that he is behind 
y 
7. ↑Show(x,z, ↓After(y).Is(x)) → ↑StandBehind(x, y) 
 
If you need to show others that you are behind y, then you should 
stand behind y 
8. ↓StandBehind(x, y) ∧ ↓After(y).Is(⊥) → ↓Member(x).In ∧ 
↓After(y).Is(x) ∧ ↓After(x).Is(⊥) 
 
If x stands behind y, and y was at the back, then x has joined the 
queue and he is after y, with nobody behind him 
9. ↓StandBehind(x, y) → ↓After(y).Is(x) 
 
If x stands behind y, then x is after y in the queue 
10. ↓StandBehind(z, y) ∧ ↓After(y).Is(x) → ↓Violation(z) 
 
If x is behind y, and z attempts to stand behind y also, then z has 
made a violation 
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11. ↓Violation(z) → ↑Rebuke(x, z) 
 
Everybody should rebuke someone who commits a violation 
12. ↓After(x).Is(y) ∧ ↓After(y).Is(z) ∧ ↓WalkAway(y, t) → 
↓After(x).Is(z) ∧ ↓Member(y).Out 
 
If y is between x and z, and y walks away, then z moves up to be 
behind x, and y is removed from the queue 
 
 
Rules for the person at the front of the queue: 
 
13. ↓After(t).Is(x) → ↑User(t).Is(x) 
 
If x is at the front of the queue, he should use the distinguished 
object 
14. ↓After(t).Is(x) ∧ ↓~User(t).Is(x) → ↓Violation(x) 
 
If x is at the front of the queue, and fails to use the distinguished 
object, he has made a violation 
15 ↓After(t).Is(x) ∧ ↓User(t).Is(y) → ↓Violation(z) 
 
If x is next in line to use the distinguished object and somebody else 
uses it, he has made a violation 
 
 
Notes: 
• There will be cases when two different people y and z will 
both try to stand behind x, and the practice should have ways 
of resolving to decide who is actually behind x. Civilized 
queuing involves adding resolution rules like, for example: 
• ↓StandBehind(y, x) ∧ ↓StandBehind(z, x) ∧ ↓Before(y,z) → 
↓In(y) ∧ ↓After(x).Is(y) 
• These rules have universally quantified variables, but L does 
not contain variables! These rules are our generic 
representation of items which generate the token instances, 
and it is the token instances which are part of L. 
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In this simple example, the queue starts off completely empty with 
nobody using the distinguished object, t. Then x comes along, and uses t: 
 
A. ↓After(t).Is(⊥)  
 
The queue starts off completely empty 
B. ↓Member(x).Out ∧ ↓Member(y).Out ∧ ↓Member(z).Out 
 
Each of x, y, and z starts off outside the queue 
C. ↑Use(t, x) 
 
x needs to use t 
D. ↑After(x).Is(⊥) 
 
(from A, B, C using 1) x should get to the back of the queue 
E. ↑See(x, ↓After(t).Is(⊥)) 
 
(from A, D using 4) x should realize that t is at the end of the 
queue 
F. ↑After(t).Is(x) 
 
(from A, D using 5) x should be after t  
G. ↑StandBehind(x, t) 
 
(from F using 6 and then 7) x should stand behind t 
H. ↓StandBehind(x, t) 
 
Let us suppose that x sees that he should stand behind, and does it 
I. ↓Member(x).In ∧ ↓After(t).Is(x) ∧ ↓After(x).Is(⊥) 
 
(from H using 8) x has successfully placed himself at the back of 
the queue 
J. ↑User(t).Is(x) 
 
(from I using 13) x should use the distinguished object t 
K. ↓User(t).Is(x) 
 
Let us suppose that x now uses t 
L. ↑Use(t, y) 
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Now let us suppose that y needs to use t 
M. ↑After(y).Is(⊥) 
 
(from I, L, C using 1) y should get to the back of the queue 
N. ↑See(y, ↓After(t).Is(x)) ∧ ↑See(y, ↓After(x).Is(⊥)) 
 
(from M, I using 4) y should realize that x is after t and x is at the 
back of the queue 
O. ↑After(x).Is(y) 
 
(from I using 5) y should be after x 
P. ↑StandBehind(y, x) 
 
(from O using 6 and then 7) y should stand behind x 
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Appendix C: Describing Rule-Following in L 
 
 
Consider Wittgenstein’s case of the pupil who is trying to understand a 
simple number series: adding 2. He sees the sequence of numbers 996, 998, 
1000, and at some point – hopefully – he sees that he can go on. 
Wittgenstein makes three fundamental points about this case:  
• The pupil’s understanding is not a private mental process 
• It is particular circumstances that justify his claim I can go on 
• Think of “Now I can go on” as a signal 
We have been using the first two points throughout this paper. In this 
section I want to focus on the third. 
“Now I can go on” is a way of showing the other that you see what you 
should continue the series with: 
 
↑Show(x, y, ↓See(x, ↓Series({996, 998, 1000}) → ↑ContinueSeries 
(x, {996, 998, 1000}, n))) → ↑Say (x, y, “NowICanGoOn”) 
 
In other words: x’s reason for saying I can go on is that he needs to show y 
that he sees that he should continue the series with n. 
 
Here: 
• Series(list) is a series consisting of the list of numbers 
• ContinueSeries(agent, list, next) is the agent continuing the 
list of numbers with the number next 
• nx is the number agent x thinks he should continue the series 
with 
 
Saying “Now I can go on” itself has normative import:  
 
↓Say (x, y, “NowICanGoOn”) ∧ ↓RequestsToContinue(y, x, {996, 998, 
1000}) → ↑See(x, ↓Series({996, 998, 1000}) → ↑ContinueSeries (x, {996, 998, 
1000}, n)) 
 
In other words, someone who claims that he can go on has committed 
himself to seeing how he should go on, if requested to do so.  
Even simple examples like the pupil learning to add 2 are rich in 
alternating embeddings of See/Show and ↑/↓. L was designed to be the 
simplest possible language in which to express such constructs. 
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